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THE COLD WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND PERSIA, CA. 448–412 B.C.

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RECENTLY, there has been some controversy as to whether the Peace of Callias was really sworn about 449 B.C. One of the major objections against thinking so is that there is known to have been fighting between Greeks and Persians only a few years later.¹ Then there is also the puzzle why there seems to be one year missing from the Athenian tribute lists. Some scholars seriously doubt that Athens renounced collection of *phoros* for any year at all.²

There is one simple explanation which will cover these phenomena: namely, that a Peace of Callias was in fact concluded about 449; that, as a result, no tribute was collected in the spring of 448; that a number of incidents between the confederates of Athens and of Persia occurred along the line separating the King's territory from the Greek fringe of Asia Minor; and that Athens therefore recommenced collection of tribute in the spring of 447. These incidents were neither preceded nor followed by the dispatch of heralds to declare war, for which there was precedent in

Athenian history.³ There were no major operations of fleets numbering hundreds of warships as there had been in the past. Instead, for over thirty years there was a kind of cold war between the two powers, a situation of vague menace, of raids, of small successes, of countermoves, of embassies and threats.

That such incidents took place between agencies of Persia and of Athens rests in part on clear statements in our literary authorities, and in part on the gradual but steady disappearance of some of Athens' allies from the Carian, Ionian, and Hellespontine tribute districts, the ones fronting on the provinces controlled by the Persian satraps at Sardis and Dascylium. Conversely, there are some very occasional records of *phoros* paid by states located fairly far upcountry. Since they normally did not pay, their tribute seems to be the result of Greek forays. This interpretation of the epigraphic evidence is, however, not always certain, because states in Caria, Lycia, or Moesia may have left the Greek league upon their own initiative and by

1. The existence of this treaty has been doubted. H. T. Wade-Gery made the basic defense of its historicity in *Athenian Studies Presented to W. S. Ferguson*, HSCP, Suppl. I (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 121–56, which was republished in his *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 201–32, to which the references in this article are made. His explanations were subsequently refined in B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, III (Princeton, 1949), 275 (hereafter cited as *ATL*). The reality of the peace was denied by R. Sealey, *Historia*, III (1954), 325–33. J. H. Oliver replied to parts of this article in *Historia*, VI (1957), 254–55. D. Stockton, *Historia*, VIII (1959), 61–73,

once more denied the reality of the peace, but he drew counter-arguments from A. Andrewes, *Historia*, X (1961), 1–18; R. Meiggs, HSCP, LXVII (1963), 11–15; and S. K. Eddy, *CP*, LXV (1969), 8–14.

2. That no tribute was collected in 449/8 is discussed in *ATL*, III, 278–99. W. K. Pritchett argued in *Historia*, XIII (1964), 129–34, that there was no year in which tribute went uncollected; he was answered by B. D. Meritt in *Hesperia*, XXXV (1966), 134–40, and by M. F. McGregor in *GRBS*, VIII (1967), 102–12.

3. The “unheralded war” between Athens and Aegina: Hdt. 5. 81, 84–89.

their own efforts, afterwards to maintain their independence against Hellene and Persian alike. Therefore, before proceeding to review what is known of this cold war, I must first set forth what little we know of the strength of the non-Hellenic states of western Asia Minor, and what we know of their attitudes toward Persians and Greeks.

Caria was a mountainous region divided into a considerable number of petty states ruled by princely families, who often fought one another for power and land. In such circumstances, some dynasts, seeking the favor and assistance of the Great King, rendered him service. Thus, in 499, Oliatus of Mylasa and Histiaeus of Termera thought to take part in a Persian naval expedition.⁴ When the Ionian Greeks revolted against Darius, the Hellenes won most Carians to their side.⁵ It is significant, however, that not all the dynasts had abandoned Darius, and that, after he had crushed the Ionian Revolt, although some Carian princes had to be reduced to obedience by force, others returned voluntarily.⁶

In Xerxes' time the dynastic family of Halicarnassus was Persophile. Its most famous representative was Artemisia, the fighting queen who served the King so remarkably. In the campaign of 480 she led five ships, including vessels from Cos, Nisyrus, and Calydna. She took advantage of the confusion of the Battle of Salamis to ram and sink the ship of Damasithymus of Calynda, her ally, subject, and rival.⁷

Termera, Syangela, and Alabanda also fought for Xerxes. Altogether, the Carians furnished him about thirty warships.⁸ Not all the princes were so enthusiastic as Artemisia. Some, we may safely infer, had been bribed or cowed into fighting, because Themistocles, immediately after the Battle of Artemisium, expected that some could be induced to change sides.⁹ Yet it was not until a year later, after the Battle of Mycale, that a number of dynasts did so, some out of hatred of Persia, others swimming with the stronger current.

These swimmers were, after all, small and weak. One of the largest was Termera, but after 454 Athens assessed her tribute at only two and a half talents. Calydna at one and a half was smaller, and Mylasa at 5,200 drachms and Syangela at 3,000 were minuscule. Inland states must have relied as much on the mountainous terrain for protection against foreign great powers as on any other safeguard. Coastal states had no such advantage, and they seem often to have accepted the domination of whatever fleet—Greek or Persian—chose to assert it. Idyma's puniness, for example, is reflected in her *phoros* of less than a talent, a smaller amount than was contributed by the Greek island of Seriphos, which was legendary for insignificance.¹⁰ For Idyma and for many other Carian states, independence was out of the question if either Greeks or Persians willed otherwise.

Now it is true that during the first half of the fifth century many of the dynasts gradually became more or less Hellenized.¹¹

4. Hdt. 5. 36–37; W. W. How and J. A. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford, 1912), II, 15 (hereafter cited as How and Wells).

5. Hdt. 5. 103. Among the anti-Persian faction were Pixodarus of Cindya and Heraclides, son of Ibanollis, of Mylasa: Hdt. 5. 118, 121; How and Wells, II, 64.

6. Hdt. 6. 25.

7. Artemisia: Hdt. 7. 99; 8. 68, 87, 101–3. Calynda: Hdt. 7. 98; How and Wells, II, 164.

8. Termera: Hdt. 7. 98; How and Wells, II, 164. Syangela: Hdt. 7. 98 mentions a Carian Pigres, but he gives him no ethnic; that comes from the quota lists, as shown by G. E.

Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA*, LII (1957), 93–94. Alabanda: Hdt. 7. 194. Number of ships: Hdt. 7. 93 says seventy, which has been halved by W. W. Tarn, *JHS*, XXVIII (1908), 202–10; C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 345–50 and the literature he cites.

9. Hdt. 8. 19, 22; How and Wells, II, 240.

10. Termera: *ATL*, I, 420; Calydna: I, 294; Mylasa: I, 346; Syangela: I, 416. Idyma: List 2, I 15; G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA*, LII (1957), 68–71, 143–46. Seriphos: Plut. *Them.* 28. 3.

11. G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA*, L (1955), 113; R. Shafer, *AC*, XXXIV (1965), 404.

This fact implies, however, nothing more than a growing taste for Greek pots and architecture, and it should not be interpreted as showing that the princes were eager to fight against the King to extend the area of Delian imperialism, which by 450 included so much of Caria. Instead, there was a certain amount of Hellenophobia in Caria, as we learn from some interesting data in the tribute lists. The first recorded payment of Prince Paktyes of Idyma was made in 452; he is known to have paid again in 450. Thereafter his name is missing, but the state continued to pay, now in the name of the Idymaeans. It was long ago suggested that this change shows that the regime of Paktyes had been succeeded by some other.¹² Similar evidence relates to Pigres of Syangela. He paid in 453 and 449; from 447 to 439 it was the Syangelans who paid.¹³ If Sambaktys was dynast of Cillara, then he also was supplanted; he is known to have paid in 453 and 451 but not afterwards, although the Cillarans continued to pay.¹⁴ The certain replacement of Paktyes and Pigres and the probable replacement of Sambaktys, all probably in 449, suggest very strongly that Athens, probably with the assistance of factions of Carians in each state, dismissed the dynasts and substituted a new kind of government. Athens cannot, however, have been acting to propagate democracy, because we know that a fourth prince, Tymnes of Termera, continued to rule until 439.¹⁵ His survival makes probable that action was taken against the other three rulers on account of their unfriendly attitude toward the Athenian *demos*.

Pigres was, most likely, the brother of the Persophile Artemisia.¹⁶ If all this is right, then around 449 there was anti-Hellenic sentiment in Caria.

Expelling dynasts of doubtful loyalty would itself tend to make other Carians anti-Athenian. And, weak and fearful as they were, the only good help they could seek was that of the Great King. After all, the Carians had escaped the Persians with Greek assistance. Now, in 449 B.C., when memory of Persian rule had faded, when dislike of Greek rule was fresh, when the debacle which took place in Egypt in 454 showed that Hellenic fleets were as vulnerable as Phoenician, what little we know of Caria's past makes us believe that many dynasts would have been rather more hostile to Athens than to Persia, as in the days of Darius and Xerxes. Here were agencies Persia could use. Better a dynast enthroned under Persian suzerainty than a dynast deposed in the Greek sphere, reduced to admiration for the glories of Hellenic poetry and the beauties of Attic red-figured ware. And if dynasts did seek help from the King, we may safely infer that the King asked for a *quid pro quo*, namely, alliance or subordination of some sort. After 449/8 B.C., that might well involve a breach of the Peace of Callias.

In Lycia there were slightly different circumstances. This rugged corner of Anatolia was also divided into a number of weak principalities, but several of them at some time organized a loose confederation, probably to offer a united front to foreigners.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Lycia had been subject to Darius and Xerxes, and in 480 it

12. The record of payment by Paktyes and Idyma is summarized in *ATL*, I, 288. Paktyes' collapse: W. H. Waddington, *RN*, (1856), 59; B. V. Head, *BMC, Caria* (London, 1897), p. lxi; E. Babelon, *Traité des monnaies grecques et romaines*, II.2 (Paris, 1935), 995–96. The evidence in the quota lists is in harmony with that of the coins of Idyma, which were struck late in the fifth century with the legend *ΙΔΥΜΙΩΝ*.

13. *ATL*, I, 414.

14. Sambaktys: Lists 1, II 27; 3, V 12; his state from G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA*, LII (1957), 145.

15. Tymnes: *ATL*, I, 446; his state: B. V. Head, *BMC, Caria* (London, 1897), pp. lxxviii, 176.

16. Plut. *De mal. Herod.* 43; Suidas, s.v. "Pigres."

17. List 9, III 3–4 shows that a *syntely*, a loose association, existed already in the middle of the fifth century. See, too, B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum*² (London 1911), p. 688 (here-

supplied a contingent, supposedly of fifty ships.¹⁸ Inevitably divisiveness, federalism or not, existed among the Lycian families. Their coinages were struck on two different standards of weight; states in western Lycia—Telmessus, Caryanda, Xanthus, Tlos, Patara—used the lighter of the two.¹⁹ The dynasts of the fifth and fourth centuries were culturally mixed, having Lycian names like Khārāi and Tāththivāibe, Greek like Pericles, and Persian like Mithrapata.²⁰

As the fifth century went on, both Greek and Persian influence penetrated Lycia. Although some princes employed Greek artists to embellish their palaces, Hellenism does not appear to have outstripped Oriental civilization. On the contrary, the great inscribed funeral pillar in Xanthus shows the eastern taste of this powerful family. At the top of the pillar the prince was enthroned in glory. His sepulchre was decorated in a style similar to that of Achaemenid tombs, and the monument was set off with forequarters of bulls very like those which formed the capitals of the columns at Persepolis.²¹

Some time after 477 the Lycians entered the Delian League. That was, perhaps, the result of strong coercive measures, for the French excavators of Xanthus found evidence that about 470 B.C. a fierce fire raged on the acropolis. It may have been the result of the Greek campaign which led to the Battle of Eurymedon.²² The Xanthians subsequently rebuilt the acropolis on a

more luxurious scale and imported a great deal of Attic and Rhodian pottery.²³ Yet they do not seem to have been Athenophile. A few Lycians furnished tribute to Athens in 451 and 450, and both Telmessus and the Lycian syntely did so in 445.²⁴ But after that year there is no further record of tribute from the region, and there is definite literary evidence, as we shall see below, that the Lycians became either allies or subjects of the Persians again, soon after the Peace of Callias, and well before 412 B.C.

As for Mysia, where some states belonged to Athens' Hellespontine tribute district, few certain data of internal conditions exist, but circumstances must have been about the same as in Caria and Lycia.

Thus, examination of the attitudes of the Anatolian peoples in the marches between the Greek sphere and the Persian shows that while particularism was a motive for a state to withdraw from the Delian League, many states were nevertheless too small and too geographically exposed to Greek reprisal to have been able to gain independence without assistance from a third party. When it is observed, therefore, that a small state has failed to pay tribute to Athens, we may infer that she probably did so with the support of the only other great power, the Persian Empire. This inference is supported by the geographical location of the seven states known to have dropped out of the Hellespontine district between 449 and 439. With the single

after cited as Head, *HN*²). Whether this was a federal league is doubtful; J. A. O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 240–63, describes the Hellenized league of the Hellenistic period, for which Strab. 14. 3. 3 (664–65) gives important evidence.

18. Hdt. 7. 92. Isocrates says (4. 161) that the Lycians were never conquered by the Persians. If he is right, which is most doubtful, it would mean that the Lycians voluntarily joined Xerxes' forces in hopes of plunder.

19. O. Mørkholm, *JNG*, XV (1964), 69–76; M. Hirmer and C. M. Kraay, *Greek Coins* (London, 1966), 361 (hereafter cited as Hirmer-Kraay).

20. On the Lycian dynasts, see G. F. Hill, *BMC, Lycia*

(London, 1897), pp. xix, xxvi, xxix–xliv; B. V. Head, *HN*², pp. 690–93; F. W. König, *Die Stele von Xanthos* (Vienna, 1936), pp. 37, 56–60; A. T. Olmstead, *A History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago, 1948), pp. 348–49.

21. P. Demargne, *Fouilles de Xanthos, I: Les piliers funéraires* (Paris, 1962), *passim*; *REA*, LXII (1960), 41–47.

22. H. Metzger, *Fouilles de Xanthos, II: L'acropole lycienne* (Paris, 1963), *passim*.

23. H. Metzger, *REA*, LXIII (1961), 271–75.

24. *ATL*, I, 334–35. Our lack of certainty comes from the necessity of restoring the names [Telmessioi kai L]ukioi in List 3. I 29–30.

exception of Tyrodiza, all were on the Asiatic side of the Straits, an entirely one-sided distribution. If defections were due purely to local motives and forces, we should expect to find the states about equally divided on both sides of the Straits. Furthermore, these seven defections should be understood in the context of the tribute record of the important Greek state of Cyzicus. She is first known to have sent *phoros* in 446, when she made the very small partial payment of 4,320 drachms. The authors of *ATL* think this shows that Cyzicus was subject for some time to the constraint of the Persian satrap nearby at Dascylium.²⁵ If so, it is hard not to think that the same satrap was often a factor in the other irregularities along the Hellespont.

Moreover, we do have a little good evidence that Greek states appealed to Persia for help before 440. First, Erythrae, missing from all the quota lists of 454–450 B.C., was in revolt between about 455 and 452, when she returned to membership in the Delian Confederacy. Then the Athenian *demos* handed down regulations which specified that the Erythraeans were to have nothing to do with their Medizing citizens in exile.²⁶ Second, when the Samian oligarchs rebelled against Athens in 440, they first made alliance with Pissuthnes, the satrap at Sardis. He helped them hire seven hundred mercenary soldiers, and he kept in his power the Athenian garrison which was captured on Samos.²⁷ Note that in neither case is there evidence of Persian initiative or of the use of native Persian or Median soldiers. A large proportion of the Persian army, however, was made up of local levies led by Persian officers, and

such troops were certainly used by Pissuthnes against Colophon and Notium later on.²⁸ More important, note that the Persians hover on the fringes, anxious to injure Athens, giving indirect assistance and support, acting just as those who break treaties by subterfuge should. In some cases, it would have been sufficient for them to supply only money to stir up factions of anti-Athenians, like the Samian oligarchs. This, indeed, was an often-used Persian technique, employed in 456 when the Peloponnesians received money to fight Athens because the latter was attacking Persia's province of Egypt.²⁹ Gifts of money, of course, may have been accompanied by promises (sincere or otherwise) of military support if Athens should react violently against the suborned state.

Let us now follow events. The Peace of Callias was sworn probably in 449, and war between Greeks and Persians, and the allies of both, ended. The terms of the peace were, in brief, that the Great King recognized the autonomy of a considerable number of small states along the western coast of Asia Minor which once had been subjects of his ancestors, but now were members of the Delian Confederacy. He agreed to keep away from them. His soldiers would remain east of a rough north-south line a little to the west of Sardis. His warships would stay east of a line connecting Phaselis and the Chelidonian Islands in the Mediterranean and another passing through the Cyanean Rocks in the Black Sea near the Bosphorus. The Greeks would keep their warships west of these places, would refrain from pillaging the King's territories, and would leave Asia Minor unfortified.³⁰

25. *ATL*, III, 24; Cyzicus' record of payment, *ATL*, I, 320–21. Dascylium: *ATL*, I, 258.

26. *IG* 1². 10 = *ATL*, II, D 10 = R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1969), No. 40 (hereafter cited as Meiggs-Lewis). This case, admittedly, comes from the period before the Peace of Callias was made.

27. Thuc. 1. 115. 4–5. It is quite possible that these seven

hundred mercenaries were Greek. If so, then the intervention of Pissuthnes was about as well disguised as it could have been.

28. Army: Hdt. 7. 61–87; Colophon and Notium: Thuc. 3. 34. 1–3.

29. Thuc. 1. 109. 2–3.

30. See n. 1.

With no more war to fight against the barbarians, Athens collected no more tribute from her allies in 448. But nearly at once something happened to change Athens' mind about the tribute, because we know that *phoros* was demanded and collected for, almost certainly, the year 447.³¹ The most likely cause was that Athens found herself in difficulties at various points along the line from Caria to Mysia, realized the Persians were to some degree involved, and did not know what would happen next. The quota list for 447 shows that Dascylium (a small state on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, not the satrapal capital of the same name) did not pay. She is not known to have paid after 449 for sixteen years, and we are sure that she did not pay in 442, 441, or 439. Further, no tribute is known to have come in from Cyzicus until 446, when she contributed less than one of the nine talents normally due from her. It might be supposed, therefore, that in 448 the satrap of Dascylium caused some of the coastal districts east of Priapus to be raided. Additionally, in the south Colophon was still in revolt.³² Her rebellion had begun about 450 B.C., and it continued through the year in which the Peace of Callias was sworn. If the Persians were giving support to the Colophonians, as some scholars have thought, this, along with the trouble in Mysia, would have given Athens reason for ordering the resumption of tribute payment in the spring of 447.

Now Wade-Gery and the other authors of *ATL* think that the reason no tribute came in during the spring of 448 was that Pericles and his circle forwent collection because of the nearly simultaneous Pan-

hellenic congress.³³ R. Meiggs and D. Lewis think it possible that all the tribute was taken in, but was given over to some special project, which they guess was the construction of the Temple of Athena Nike; for this reason the collection was unrecorded.³⁴ These two assertive explanations will not do. If they are right, the omission was without precedent, parallel, or indeed, reason. It seems to me that the easiest and most natural explanation of the fact that no *phoros* was collected was that the old war had just ended. Therefore, there was no legal reason or convenient pretext for Athens to take the money. But, when the cold war began, probably in the summer or fall of 448, collection was reimposed for the reason originally accepted in 477 by the allies, namely, to finance the war of the Hellenes against *hoi barbaroi*. That the trouble in 448 was small and late in the year can probably be inferred from the quite irregular, straggling, partial payments in List 7, evidence of reluctance among the allies to see a need for their old contributions.

There is a passage which supports my interpretation of the epigraphic evidence to which D. Stockton called attention some years ago: Plutarch *Pericles* 12. 1–3. Here Pericles' opponents attack him for his policy towards the League. Athens has kept possession of the treasure of the League, they say, although it had been created out of the contributions of the confederated states. Thus, Athens is behaving like a tyrant, using the money not to fight *hoi barbaroi*, but to decorate herself like a harlot with temples worth a thousand talents. Pericles replies that Athens need not render an account of the use of these

31. See n. 2.

32. The evidence for the revolt of Colophon is her non-payment of *phoros* from 449 to 447 (*ATL*, I, 316) and the mutilated remains of a treaty between Colophon and Athens (*JG* 12, 14–15 = *ATL*, II, D 15 = Meiggs-Lewis, No. 47). See, too, *ATL*, III, 58, 282. In 449 for unknown reasons the

tribute of Astacus fell drastically from nine thousand to one thousand drachms. This *may* have been the result of damage to her territory.

33. H. T. Wade-Gery, *Hesperia*, XIV (1945), 212–15; *ATL*, III, 281.

34. Meiggs-Lewis, pp. 134–35.

funds, “since she is fighting for (προπολεμοῦντες) the allies, holding off the barbarians.” Athens, he says, is contributing ships and manpower, whereas the allies are furnishing only money. Stockton insisted that the present tenses in these lines be noted, for they compel us to believe that at the time the remarks were exchanged, *after* the Peace of Callias, military operations of uncertain scope and intensity were in progress.³⁵ And the debate must have occurred after 449, when the Parthenon and other buildings were either about to be begun or had just been started, and before 443, when Thucydides son of Melesias, leader of Pericles’ opponents, was ostracized and his faction silenced for some time. Whether *hoi barbaroi* mentioned were Persians is impossible to say. But the natural interpretation is that Pericles’ detractors fault him for not using the money for the original purpose, that is, defense of the Hellenic states and attack upon the King’s territories in Asia.

A last point. Pericles and his enemies seem to differ as to whether any fighting was going on. I suppose that in this instance we must believe Pericles. But if such a difference of opinion could be maintained in public debate, it must show that the fighting was on a very small scale. That is all the evidence in the quota lists suggests: troubles at Priapus, Cyzicus, Colophon, and perhaps a few other, unknown spots. Therefore, putting the best possible face on Athens’ demand for the resumption of tribute, the demand must have been in the

nature of a precaution against a resumption of major fighting, for the money was hardly necessary to meet expenses for war on so reduced a level.

But why should the Persian King wish to make trouble at all, when the Peace of Callias had only just been sworn? Surely Artaxerxes found it distasteful to resign himself to the permanent loss of the wealthy coastal areas of Caria, Ionia, Aeolis, and Mysia. Not only had they formerly paid his ancestors, according to Herodotus, some hundreds of talents yearly, they had also been the possessions of his imperial dynasty, whose right to rule all Asia rested on no less a sanction than the will of Ahura Mazdāh himself.³⁶

As for Greeks who violated the peace, there must have been some who would have been glad of the chance to reap more booty from the rich territories of the King, either as reprisal or as an end in itself.³⁷

On the other hand, both Artaxerxes and the Greeks had excellent reasons for not waging war on a grand scale. Athens and her allies had sustained heavy losses in Egypt in 454 and off Cyprus in 450.³⁸ For Athens there was the nearly certain possibility that the struggle with Sparta and her allies would soon resume. The Persians also had recently suffered heavy losses in Egypt and off Cyprus. Their Phoenician navy had been badly mauled in its last four straight major engagements with the Greeks, and it seems not to have recovered for some time.³⁹ The central government was contending with the rebellion of

35. D. Stockton, *Historia*, VIII (1959), 69. Stockton used this passage to demonstrate that, since there had been fighting not long after 449, when this argument took place, there had been no treaty in *ca.* 449. That, of course, does not follow.

36. Tribute: Hdt. 3. 90. Persian resignation: note the first clause in the treaty of 412 between Darius II and the Lacedaemonians: “Whatsoever territories or states belong to King Darius or used to belong to his father or their ancestors . . .” (Thuc. 8. 37. 2). The Persian claim to rule *all* Asia was known to Aeschylus (*Pers.* 762–70) and Herodotus (1. 4). This claim is explained in the context of the Old Persian inscriptions as

a part of Achaemenid royal religion in S. K. Eddy, *The King is Dead* (Lincoln, 1961), pp. 41–43.

37. The acquisition of booty was one of the important original purposes of the Delian League: Thuc. 1. 96. 1; R. Sealey, “The Origin of the Delian League,” in *Ancient Society and Institutions* (Oxford, 1966), pp. 233–55.

38. Thuc. 1. 99. 4–100. 1; 100. 4–5; 112. 4.

39. Losses: Diod. 12. 3. 3 says that the Persians lost many ships sunk off Cyprus and one hundred captured; Thuc. 1. 112. 2 and Plut. *Cim.* 18. 5 give no details. Recovery: in 440 Pericles was apparently prepared to take on the Persian ships reported to be coming west with a squadron of only sixty

Megabyzus in Syria; and there was revolt in Egypt, where Amyrtaeus and Psammetichus still held out after the capture of Inarus.⁴⁰ Hence, the Persians contented themselves with nibbling at the Greek league from the landward side. Small detachments of pro-Persian Anatolians raided Greek or pro-Greek Anatolian states, or bribery and other appropriate forms of nonmilitary persuasion were employed.

For their part, the Greeks did not react strongly. About 447 Colophon was recovered. Harpagium, situated on the Propontis not far west of Cyzicus, is known to have paid tribute for the first time; and in 446 Cyzicus at last began to send in *phoros*, from at least 443/2 paying regularly. That is all we know. Thus, both parties avoided open war.

Around 445 B.C., while Athens was losing a short, sharp war with the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, one city near the Hellespont and eight in Caria threw off their allegiance to her. Some of these states, notably Cebrene, were upcountry, where Athens would have found it hard to get at them and Persia easy to support them.⁴¹

And now there are indications of Athenian reprisal. It would, of course, have paid Athens to help keep the rebel Psammetichus alive to make difficulties for the King in Egypt, and, indeed, she seems to have opened or resumed close relations with him at this very time. We know that in

445/4 Athens received thirty thousand measures of grain from him. We do not know what she did in exchange. But the grain may be connected with a naval offensive which we must infer the Athenians directed against Lycia about this time. Neither Telmessus nor the Lycian syntely is recorded as having paid *phoros* since 450, but in the spring of 445 both did so.⁴²

By 444, however, five more Carian and two Ionian cities fell away from the League.⁴³ And then in 442, a considerable flare-up began. Five states along the Propontis, which paid regularly both before and after this year, passed their payments, and two others, Astacus and Gentinus, which had paid in 443, missed this year and never paid again. Astacus may have been engulfed in military disaster, because she was later recolonized by Athens.⁴⁴

Athens seems to have responded. Four of the states which had been absent in 442 paid again in 441, and Paesus, the fifth, in 440. Athens and her allies appear to have carried a retaliatory campaign right into the interior of the Troad in the summer or fall of 441, because three cities which were not regular members of the League and were rather well inland paid in the spring of 440. They included Azia and Scepsis, both of whose last known payments occurred before the Peace of Callias. The third was Zelia, which is not known to have paid before or after 440.⁴⁵ That same year,

ships (Thuc. 1. 116. 3); in 431 he told the Athenian people that the Great King could not oppose the passage of the Athenian navy (Thuc. 2. 62. 2).

40. Megabyzus: Ctes. *Pers.* epit. 37–39; A. T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago, 1948), p. 312. Amyrtaeus: Thuc. 1. 100. 2, 112. 3. Psammetichus: Philochorus, *FGH Hist* 328 F 130 = Schol. on Ar. *Vesp.* 718.

41. Hellespont: Cebrene (*ATL*, I, 304). Caria: Casolaba (*ATL*, I, 302); Chius (I, 440); Cydae (I, 320); Cyllandus (I, 322); Hydissus (I, 340); Hylima (I, 430); Hymissus (I, 432); Pedasa (I, 376).

42. Psammetichus: cf. n. 40. Tribute: List 9, III 33–34. It is unlikely that these two Lycian states would both have been absent from the three partially preserved Lists 5, 7, and 8 if they had not actually been absent from the League, as they certainly were from 441 to 439 B.C. Olmstead (*op. cit.*, p. 343) believed that Pericles both undertook an unprovoked offen-

sive against Lycia and a year or two later reorganized the Delian League into five tribute regions in preparation for renewed war with Persia.

43. Caria: Arlissus (*ATL*, I, 244); Bolbe (I, 246); Codapes (I, 316); Cyrbissus (I, 324); and Erines (I, 272). Ionia: Assus (I, 280) and Maeandrius (I, 336).

44. Hellespont: Azia (*ATL*, I, 216); Cius (I, 308); Neandria (I, 352); Paesus (I, 364); and Priapus (I, 388). Astacus: Strab. 12. 4. 2 (563). Or was she a victim of earthquake or pestilence? F. A. Lepper, *JHS*, LXXXII (1962), 46, thought that these absences made this a year of major crisis.

45. Azia: *ATL*, I, 216; Scepsis: I, 408; Zelia: I, 276. A new state, Neapolis-from-Athens, made her first recorded payment in 441 (I, 352). Since she was situated on the European side of the Propontis, she may have been founded by Athens to be a secure, loyal naval station out of the reach of Persian horsemen.

441, Idyma, down in Caria, made her last known payment to the League.⁴⁶

Up to this time, Athens had suffered the long-term or permanent loss of twenty-four states in Lycia, Caria, Ionia, and along the Propontis. She made no determined attempt to recapture them. She had a number of reasons for not doing so. First, most of them were some distance from the sea, where it would have been relatively difficult to attack them, and, given their spotty record of payment, equally hard to retain them. Lycia, as the story will show, was as hard to control as a nest of hornets. Second, most of them were small states—Gentinus, for example, was assessed only five hundred drachms—whose combined tribute was only twenty-two talents. That was less than the cost of a campaign.

Yet combined operations of soldiers and ships in some places around the Aegean were neither beyond Athens' power nor particularly dangerous. And why Athens should have allowed a weak, presumably unfortified, coastal state like Idyma to remain out of the League is difficult to understand. It was not good for imperial discipline. Further, the cost of coercion might be nearly nil. Athens maintained in peacetime a squadron of warships in full commission for training, and what training is better than minor enterprises against beatable enemies?⁴⁷ But the fact that Athens made no move is understandable if we deduce that the small state had a friend in a great power with whom Athens wished to avoid open war. Such a power can only have been the Persian Empire.

Still, the loss of some twenty-four states must have had some effect on the outlook

of the notables around the Aegean. It was in this atmosphere and at this time that the revolt of the important state of Samos was prepared. When she defied Athens in 440, she can only have done so—if the Samian oligarchs were rational men—on the understanding that Persian support, which would include naval assistance, was forthcoming. The Samian navy of about fifty-five triremes was far too weak alone to withstand the fleet of Athens,⁴⁸ and it had been the Ionians' loss of command of the sea that had doomed the Ionian revolt in 494. Surely at Samos, which had taken so large a part in that earlier rebellion, there were men who remembered.

It is in the context of the actual and threatened loss of a good many states between 442 and 440 that we must consider Thucydides' judgment that in the latter year it seemed that Athens might lose control of the sea.⁴⁹ The historian must have meant that the real danger was the possibility of a simultaneous intervention by Persia, which he knew the Samians had sent Stesagoras to Phoenicia to arrange.

Therefore, we may believe that the Samian oligarchs decided to risk Athens' displeasure by going to war with Miletus in 441, and then openly rebelling in 440, because a year or two earlier they had seen that the King's satraps were actively, if only on a small scale, intriguing with states in the Athenian Confederacy, and for that reason were potential allies of Samos.

There are other indications that events of 442 played a part in the Samian revolt. We may assume, I think, that Samos took steps to create a war fund in advance of her conflict with Miletus. J. P. Barron has attributed the series of Samian tetra-

46. *ATL*, I, 288.

47. Plutarch says (*Per.* 11. 4) that Athens put a squadron of sixty ships in commission every year for the eight months of good weather. The squadron numbered not sixty but sixteen ships: S. K. Eddy, *GRBS*, IX (1968), 115–30. That these should have sufficed to coerce a small state is shown by the size of the tribute squadrons sent against Lycia and Caria in the Archi-

damian War: six under Melesander in 429 (*Thuc.* 2. 69. 1–2), and twelve under Lysicles in 428 (*Thuc.* 3. 19. 2).

48. *Thuc.* 1. 116. 1, 3. The number is confirmed by *Diod.* 12. 27. 4 and *Plut. Per.* 25. 5. For the strength of the Samian fleet see S. K. Eddy, *CP*, LXIII (1968), 192–95.

49. *Thuc.* 8. 76. 4.

drachms marked with the letters *B* through *E* to the years 453–39 B.C. There survive from the year *M* (442/1) seven specimens, from 441/0 four, and from 440/39 two. If the numbers surviving correctly reflect the volume of mintage during these three years, then Samian preparations for war began in the year of large-scale trouble along the Hellespont.⁵⁰

There is unimpeachable evidence that at the time of the Samian War Persia acted against Athens and broke the treaty. In 441/0 the Samians rejected an Athenian order to stop their war with Miletus. Accordingly, the Athenians sailed against them, overthrew the oligarchic government, and installed a democratic one propped up with an Athenian garrison. Some of the Samian oligarchs were deposited in Lemnos as hostages, but others escaped and made their way to Sardis, where Pissuthnes was satrap. He agreed not only to make an alliance with them, but also to furnish them seven hundred mercenary soldiers. With this force, the fugitives crossed the Sardis line, passed over to Samos by night, captured the Athenian soldiers, and handed them over to Pissuthnes. Open war between Athens and Samos followed.⁵¹

Only a short time later, Byzantium followed Samos into revolt, and the danger of general war hung over the Aegean. The Persians did more than assist the Samians with mercenaries. It appears that their navy made a demonstration along the Phaselis line, or even to the west of it, to draw Athenian triremes away from Samos. Whether or not such a diversion was

really the Persians' intent, that was the effect. When Pericles detached sixty ships eastwards toward Caunus, the Samians quickly attacked those left behind, defeated them, and for two weeks enjoyed control of the waters around their island.⁵²

In the autumn of 440 Athens faced trouble elsewhere in Asia Minor. Part of the evidence, again, comes from the quota lists. I have argued elsewhere that the word *epiphora*, which appears as a rubric in these lists, does not stand for a fine levied by Athens, as had earlier been maintained, but designates a voluntary overpayment of *phoros* by a state either threatened by an enemy or in need of assuring Athens of her loyalty. It is a certainty that all but one of the twenty-four known payments of *epiphora* were made by states on the fringes of a troubled area. Since twenty payments came from the Ionian and the Asiatic side of the Hellepontine districts, it must be that the troubles feared by these cities were often assisted by the Persians. In the spring of 439, while the Samian War was still in progress, no less than eight payments of *epiphora*—the earliest known—were recorded at Athens. The eight states formed three clusters. Two were in Ionia: Myrina–Cyme–Pitane and Notium–Dioseritae. The third was in the Troad, including Lamponia and Dardanus upcountry and Astyra, a coastal state within twenty-five miles of Lamponia.⁵³

Now, whatever the precise nature of the danger near the Hellespont, there seems to be evidence that Athens responded to it with armed force. There exists a casualty list which almost certainly belongs to the

50. J. P. Barron, *The Silver Coins of Samos* (London, 1966), pp. 59–64, 81.

51. Thuc. 1. 115. 4–116. 1; 116. 3; Diod. 12. 27. 3–4. Thucydides does not say that Pissuthnes furnished the seven hundred soldiers. Nor does he say that he did not. He merely says, in his hasty narrative, that the Samian exiles obtained them. Diodorus does specifically say Pissuthnes supplied them, and it is best to believe him, because foreigners (the Samians) could scarcely obtain troops in the satrap's territory without the satrap's consent.

52. Thuc. 1. 116. 1–117. 1; Diod. 12. 28. 1; Plut. *Per.* 36. 1–2.

53. S. K. Eddy, *AJP*, LXXXIX (1968), 129–43. Two cities are also missing from the Ionian panel for 439, although they paid both before and after this year. They are Marathesium and Priene. In these two cases we do not necessarily have to believe that these absences were caused by Persian activity, because the two states (or either one of them) may have refused payment out of sympathy with Samos.

campaign year 440 (the usual dating) because it names men killed in fighting around Byzantium, which we know was in revolt in this year.⁵⁴ R. Meiggs has suggested that this inscription should be redated to around 447 B.C., because, with A. W. Gomme, he assumed that the casualties for each campaign year were recorded on a single stone. Since the list contains no names of men killed at Samos, he regarded the omission as fatal to the orthodox date.⁵⁵

But Meiggs's basic argument that the casualties of a single year were engraved on a single stone is wrong. Before 440 more than one stone was set up for many campaign years. The names of the 192 men killed at Marathon were inscribed on several steles. There were perhaps as many as ten for *ca.* 459 B.C. The list for 457 was engraved on at least two stones. Casualty list E.M. 12883 was part of a monument of five slabs set side by side.⁵⁶ It is impossible to think that the funerary stele for 440, or for any other year in which serious fighting took place, could have been made from a single block. The stone under consideration, *IG* I². 943+, records only fifty-eight names, yet it was large, 76 by 19 inches. It could scarcely have been made taller if writing at the top was to be legible, and it would have been difficult to make it wider without risking breakage during quarrying, transport, and erection. The Athenian dead at Samos, I suppose, must have numbered rather more than fifty-eight, because the fleet had been involved in three naval actions, one of which it lost, and the army in a siege of some months. We must understand, therefore, that the casualty list for 440 was inscribed on several steles set side

by side, of which *IG* I². 943+ is the sole survivor. It records the names of men who fell along the Hellespont; the other stele(s) would have had the lists for other regions.

Now this list includes names of men killed "in the Chersonnesus," "at Byzantium," and of eight men who died, "in the other engagements." The latter must also have been near the Hellespont, as the epitaph at the bottom of the monument says. In view, then, of the payment of *epiphora* by three cities east of the Dardanelles, these eight deaths are most probably to be connected with trouble on the Asiatic side of the Straits.⁵⁷

We might reconstruct the sequence of events around the Hellespont as follows. After Samos rebelled, Byzantium followed her example. Next there was trouble within the Chersonnesus. Then the Persians, wanting to pay back Athens for her campaign into the Troad the year before, took advantage of her difficulties on the European side of the Dardanelles to intrigue on the Asiatic side. Astyra, Lamponia, and Dardanus became anxious and appealed to Athens for help, sending in *epiphora*. Against these dangers Athens responded with expeditions against Byzantium, to the Chersonnesus, and into the hinterland of the Troad. All were on a modest scale. The campaigns appear to have been, on the whole, successful for Athens; toward the end of 440 casualty list *IG* I². 943+ was engraved, and in the spring of 439 the tribute quota list recorded the *epiphorai* of the three loyal states.

To return to the narrative, although Athens mastered Samos in the spring of 439, tension continued. In Caria, Cindye

54. *IG* I². 943+ = Meiggs-Lewis, No. 48.

55. R. Meiggs, *HSCP*, LXVII (1963), 17–18; Meiggs-Lewis, pp. 127–28; cf. A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, I (Oxford, 1945), 357 (hereafter cited as Gomme, *Comm.*).

56. Marathon: Paus. 1. 32. 3. *Ca.* 459 B.C.: *IG* I². 929+ = Meiggs-Lewis, No. 73, is the casualty list of the single tribe

Erechtheis. 457: *IG* I². 931/2 = Meiggs-Lewis, No. 35; B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XIV (1945), 134–47. E. M. 12883: D. W. Bradeen, *Hesperia*, XXXIII (1964), 21–29.

57. Since only eight names of Athenian dead are given, the campaign must have been small. But the total Greek dead will have included casualties from other states—above all, I suppose, from the payers of *epiphora*.

and Pladasa, which had not paid in 440, did pay in 439, probably because of Athenian, or pro-Athenian, pressure. A countercurrent flowed in the Hellespont, where Arisbe made her last known payment and Gargara missed hers.⁵⁸

In 438, no less than thirteen additional Carian states, which had paid tribute the year before, failed this year and afterward to do so.⁵⁹ Four loyal cities in southern Ionia continued to send in *epiphora*.⁶⁰ It would be hard to think that Pissuthnes, his intervention in the Samian War having been foiled, had nothing at all to do with these large-scale defections or with the settlement of the surviving Samian oligarchs, his allies, at Anaea, where they constituted a pocket of strong anti-Athenian feeling.⁶¹ Persia, incidentally, was not the only country harboring rebels in exile. Athens had given asylum to Zopyrus, son of the Persian mutineer Megabyzus.

Up to now, the Athenians had had rather the worst of the contest. They had lost a considerable number of small states, although Pissuthnes' effort to gain alliance with an independent Samos, a major power, had been prevented. The Persians' actions seem to have cost them very little except money, of which they had a great deal. Realization that things were not going well was probably a major motive for Athens' fairly considerable offensive

beyond the treaty line in 437/6. Diodorus says that in this year Pericles led an expedition of no less than sixty ships into the Black Sea. There, the Athenians opened better relations with the Spartocid dynasty in the grain-rich Cimmerian Bosphorus. She also colonized Amisus and made Sinope a pro-Athenian democracy. The latter operation involved some fighting, and the Athenians suffered a number of casualties. The last task of the expedition was to overawe non-Greek rulers around the Black Sea. They must have included Persian vassals in Mysia and Bithynia.⁶²

About the same time, the Athenians dispatched an embassy to the Great King.⁶³ It looks very much as if the purpose of the ambassadors was to arrange a settlement of the alarming situation which had come about all along the Sardis line. There was also the matter of the Athenian prisoners taken at Samos. We do not know what results, if any, came from these talks. Most scholars think that the Athenian prisoners were freed, for they could scarcely have remained Persian captives indefinitely without a major strain on Persian-Athenian relations.

Difficulties, however, continued, although Athens was becoming more energetic in defense of her confederates. An Athenian expedition refounded Astacus in the Propontis, probably in 435/4.⁶⁴ In the spring of 434, the Hellespontine states of

58. Cindye: *ATL*, I, 321; Pladasa: I, 380; Arisbe: I, 234; Gargara: I, 254.

59. *ATL*, III, 212, n. 79: Bargylia, Calynda, Carians-ruled-by-Tymnes, Chalctor, Cindye, Euromus, Lepsimandus, Mydones, Mylasa, Narisbara, Parpariotae, Pladasa, and Thasthara. The authors of *ATL* say (I, 188; III, 195) only that the inland communities were allowed to drop away, and they do not apparently consider the possibility of Persian action or even of concerted action by some or all of these states.

60. Cyme, Myrina, and Pitane in southern, Astyra in northern, Ionia: S. K. Eddy, *AJP*, LXXXIX (1968), 133.

61. Thuc. 3. 19. 2; 4. 75. 2; 8. 61. 2.

62. Expedition: Diod. 12. 34. 5; Plut. *Per.* 20. 1–2; Theopompus in *FGrHist* 115 F 389 = Strab. 12. 3. 14 (547); App. *Mith.* 12. 83; Gomme, *Comm.*, I, 367–68. Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 344, regarded the expedition as Athens' effort to extract compensation for her recent loss of Lycia and most of Caria. The

authors of *ATL* (III, 114–15) wanted to push the date of Pericles' voyage back to about 450 B.C. In my view this is wrong. Since Lamachus was left in charge of thirteen triremes at Sinope (Plut. *Per.* 20. 1), it is likely that he was already a man of some age (over thirty, at least) and experience. He was, however, still agile enough in 415 B.C. to rush about and get himself killed leading a forlorn hope in desperate battle before Syracuse (Thuc. 6. 101. 6). Casualties: *IG* I², 944.

63. Ar. *Ach.* 66 and Schol.; Gomme, *Comm.*, I, 368. Possibly this embassy was the one led by Diotimus, son of Strombichus, which went via Cilicia and took forty days to reach the Persian capital (Damastes in *FGrHist* 5 F 8 = Strab. 1. 3. 1 [47]). Diotimus was *strategos* against Corinth in 433: Thuc. 1. 45. 2; *IG* I², 295+ = Meiggs-Lewis, No. 61.

64. Diod. 12. 34. 5; Strab. 12. 4. 2 (563); see, too, *ATL*, III, 288–89 and n. 68.

Lamponia and Neandria, whose town centers were inland, only about eighteen miles apart, failed to pay their tribute, and Paesus, at the entrance of the Dardanelles, sent *epiphora*. We might infer a Persian raid into their territory as reprisal for the Athenian action at Astacus. Athens appears to have gone to the support of her allies, for it is certain that two military expeditions went out in 435/4, one under G[laucōn], the other under [Pro]teas. While one of these probably operated in Chalcidice, the other may have gone into the Troad.⁶⁵

In the following year there were continuing disturbances in Asia. While Palaepercote and Neandria passed their tribute payments, Lamponia resumed hers, now increased from one thousand to fourteen hundred drachms, and paid additional *epiphora*. Along the Propontis there were interesting events. Dascylium paid for the first (recorded) time since 449 and contributed *epiphora*, and two states, Callipolis and Cius, voluntarily enrolled themselves in the League. Chalcedon also sent in *epiphora*. These three places were all fairly close to Astacus.⁶⁶

In 433/2, Lamponia again paid *epiphora*, and from Ionia came similar supplements from Grynium and Pitane. An Athenian force under Archen[utus] took the field, possibly in support. Although it cannot be proved that he went to Ionia, we know that he was not part of this year's expedition to Corcyra. He may have gone to the Propontis, where the small state of Bryllianum, near Callipolis and Dascylium, made her first known payment.⁶⁷

Since 437/6, Athens seems to have been

quick to react to any effort to disturb her allies in Asia. But after 434 she concentrated upon Greece, as the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea brought nearer the outbreak of war with Sparta. The Persians appear to have grown correspondingly less active; at least there is no evidence of trouble in 432/1. Possibly they were simply waiting for Athenian involvement with the Peloponnesians to create better opportunities for them. And perhaps this new and unaccustomed quiet convinced some Athenians that their firm reaction was finally making the King draw back. Whatever the thinking, in the late spring of 431, the Athenians sent an embassy to Susa to ask for help against Sparta.⁶⁸ Pericles and his supporters must have been a little anxious for the safety of the Greek states in Asia, so that it is possible that they were even willing, while the Peloponnesians were preparing to lay Athens waste, to offer concessions across the Aegean. It would be interesting to know just what Athens was prepared to offer Artaxerxes. Athens' mood towards the dynast Pigres certainly changed at this time, for his name replaces the name of the state Syangela in the quota list inscribed in the spring of 431.⁶⁹ The result of this overture to the King, however, seems to have been nil.

One ought not to wonder that Athens would risk war with the Peloponnesians, a war which she clearly expected to be long and hard, at the same time when she was having with the Persian Empire difficulties whose outcome could not be certainly predicted. Athens was full of forthright vitality, the energy which she had put forth a generation earlier when in

65. Expeditions: *IG* 1². 365 = *ATL*, II T72d; *epiphora*: S. K. Eddy, *AJP*, LXXXIX (1968), 139.

66. Palaepercote: *ATL*, I, 366; Neandria: I, 352. Lamponia and *epiphora*: S. K. Eddy, *AJP*, LXXXIX (1968), 139-40. Callipolis: *ATL*, I, 294. Cius: I, 308.

67. S. K. Eddy, *AJP*, LXXXIX (1968), 140; Bryllianum: *ATL*, I, 250.

68. Thuc. 2. 7. 1; Diod. 12. 41. 1; Gomme, *Comm.*, II (Oxford, 1956), 6-7. This embassy, of which Thucydides says nothing more, may have been the one led by Diotimus.

69. List 23, I 66-7. But see G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA*, L (1955), 113; *BSA*, LII (1957), 93-94.

a single year (*ca.* 459) her soldiers had fallen fighting in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia, Halieis, Aegina, and Megara.⁷⁰

Persia did not long remain aloof. In the late spring of 430, Pissuthnes sent his lieutenant Itamenes to help expel the pro-Athenian citizens from Colophon. With the help of barbarians, as Thucydides calls them, which probably means troops locally raised, Itamenes succeeded in capturing the city, although not before the pro-Athenians had fled to the coast and fortified themselves at Notium.⁷¹ Both sides thus unequivocally broke the Peace of Callias again. This Persian foray into Ionia was a likely cause for Pygela's payment of *epiphora* to Athens in 430/29.⁷²

At Colophon the Persians had scored an undoubted success, and it must have been one of the reasons for Athens' subsequent expedition against Caria and Lycia. The force sent was small, only six ships led by Melesander. Thucydides says that his orders were to collect arrears of tribute and to repress privateering. But Melesander must actually have been told to do more than that, for he executed his orders by harassing territory under Persian control or influence, and it is that which makes his work sound like reprisal for the loss of Colophon. If the Athenians called this "collection of arrears," the words were simply a euphemism which covered treaty-breaking. Melesander's force, then, landed in Lycia, marched upcountry, and was defeated in battle. The general was killed.⁷³

Fortunately, we have a source, the funeral stele from Xanthus, which gives

the Lycian view of this campaign including details which confirm my interpretation.⁷⁴ Melesander actually had four Lycian states on his side, Ptara, Tlos, Zagaba, and Lower Tuminehi. This implies that Athens had taken diplomatic steps to exploit the natural rivalries among the Lycian states before Melesander went ashore. Against him were Limyra and Xanthus, the largest state in the region, the domain of Prince Ceriga. We also are told that these two places had been reinforced by Persian cavalry, and, possibly, by Median horse as well. Ceriga must, therefore, have been either under Persian suzerainty or a willing ally of Artaxerxes. In fact, his family seems to have been Persophile, for it had been his uncle Cuprle who had led the Lycian ships against Greece in 480 B.C.⁷⁵ Now if there were Persian troops in Lycia, Persian influence must also have been present. Therefore, it is possible that the privateering Melesander was told to suppress was being encouraged by Pissuthnes. If Thucydides does not say so specifically, that may have been due to the historian's well-known reluctance to discuss Persian affairs.⁷⁶

The next year, 428/7, Lysicles led a larger Athenian expedition of twelve ships against Caria. The force disembarked at Myus and proceeded inland, but it also came to grief. Near the so-called Hill of Sandius it was attacked and beaten by Carians and the Samian exiles from Anaea.⁷⁷ Again, there is reason to think that Persians were marginally involved. First, there is the inherent likelihood that

70. Thuc. 1. 70. 2-9; *IG* 1². 929 = Meiggs-Lewis, No. 33.

71. Thuc. 3. 34. 1-2. In a proxyen decree (*IG* 1². 56) of about this time, Athens honored Leonidas of Halicarnassus for unknown services which *may* be connected with this incident.

72. List 25, 1 46.

73. Thuc. 2. 69. 1-2; Paus. 1. 29. 7. Gomme, *Comm.*, II, 203, doubted the vague purpose of collecting tribute because the ships were sent to get it in winter. Furthermore, this area was really outside the empire. The last known collection of tribute in Lycia had occurred as long ago as 445/4.

74. For the text, translation into German, and commentaries on the stele of Xanthus, see F. W. König, *Die Stele von Xanthos* (Vienna, 1936), pp. 56-113; and H. L. Stoltenberg, *Die termilische Sprache Lykiens* (Leverkusen, 1955), pp. 35-54; Olmstead, *op. cit.*, pp. 349-50.

75. H. L. Stoltenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

76. A. Andrewes, *Historia*, X (1961), 1-18.

77. Thuc. 3. 19. 2. Were the Carians led by a dynast named Sandius, for whom the hill was temporarily renamed to commemorate his victory? A hill with this name is unknown to all other classical writers.

some co-ordination was required to bring together native Carians and the Greek Samians. Second, the Samians we know had been allies of Pissuthnes. And third, there were Asian Greeks who at this time believed that the satrap was acting against Athens. A few months later, the Spartan admiral Alcidas arrived in the territory of Erythrae to relieve Mytilene, which was then in rebellion against Athens. Here he consulted certain unnamed Ionian and Lesbian exiles, who proposed that all of them together capture some city in Ionia or Aeolis. They told Alcidas that they believed they could also persuade Pissuthnes to wage war with them.⁷⁸ They could hold this opinion if they knew the satrap was already harassing Athens' allies.

It seems fairly certain that the Ionian exiles were from Ephesus. A Spartan inscription of this time lists some Ephesians who made contributions to the Lacedaemonian war fund. If this is true, it suggests that the line of communication between these Athenophobic Ionians and Pissuthnes was worked by the Persian Magi who we know lived in Ephesus. Whatever the case, the promising intrigue foundered on Alcidas' fears that his ships would be located and snapped up by the Athenian navy.⁷⁹

Pissuthnes was at work at this time. A little later he moved against another of Athens' allies, this time Notium, which was a dozen miles from Ephesus. The refugees from Colophon who had fled there had fallen into factions, one Hellenizing, one Medizing. The latter appealed for mercenaries, and Pissuthnes supplied some Arcadians and Anatolians. They moved into the territory, whereupon the Atheno-

philes hastily called for help. The Athenian general Paches promptly arrived, stormed the barbarians' camp, and took it. Pissuthnes' surviving mercenaries he had executed—a drastic measure, possibly inspired by frustration with long-term troubles. Notium then received a settlement of Athenian colonists and a democratic constitution.⁸⁰

About this time there was yet another battle, which Thucydides, unfortunately, omits to mention. Ctesias says that Caunus, a small Carian city whose normal tribute was half a talent, revolted from the Confederacy. The date is uncertain. Caunus' record of tribute payment is fairly complete for the thirties, the years 439, 437, 432, and probably 431 being attested. Photius' epitome of Ctesias' account puts the revolution of Caunus last in the reign of Artaxerxes I, who died in 425/4. Therefore, we should date the rebellion between 430 and 425. The Athenians, then, naturally tried to retake the city. They sent a force whose leaders included the Persian defector Zopyrus; and when it reached Caunus, it summoned the rebels to surrender. The Caunians offered to submit to Zopyrus, but refused to yield to the Athenians. The latter then attacked the city, but the assault failed and Zopyrus was killed. Persians must have been involved in this affair, to some degree at least, because they had enough influence for Amestris, Zopyrus' grandmother, to have the Caunian who had killed him executed.⁸¹ It is, therefore, again probable that Pissuthnes had played a role in the revolt of Caunus, as he certainly had at Colophon and Notium. Perhaps Amestris' act in turn helped bring about a revulsion of feeling, for by 420

78. Thuc. 3. 31. 1.

79. Ephesian friends of Sparta: *IG* V.1. 1 = Meiggs-Lewis, No. 67. Magi: Thuc. 8. 109; Cic. *Div.* 1. 23. 47; Strab. 14. 1. 22-23 (640-41); Plut. *Alex.* 3. 4; S. K. Eddy, *The King is Dead* (London, 1961), pp. 13, 68, 175-76.

80. Thuc. 3. 34. 2-4; *IG* 12. 59 = *SEG* X. 70.

81. The flight of Zopyrus to Athens: Hdt. 3. 160. The

affair at Caunus: Ctes. *Pers.* epit. 43; Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 344. The name of Zopyrus' slayer, "Alcides" in Photius' epitome, probably should be read "Alcidas": Pape-Benseler, *Griechische Eigennamen*, s.v. "Alkidas." Caunus certainly had an anti-Athenian element in her population, which revolted again in 412/1 upon the arrival of a Peloponnesian fleet (Thuc. 8. 39. 3.).

B.C. the Athenians had recovered Caunus.⁸²

Possibly to repay the Persians for the troubles in Caria and Lycia, in the late summer of 425 the Athenians assessed tribute on Heraclea and other states along the northern coast of Asia Minor. These places were beyond the Cyanean Rocks, so that the act was a technical violation of the treaty.⁸³ At the same time the Persians, presumably encouraged by their recent successes at Colophon, Caunus, in Lycia, and in other places, aggressively considered directly assisting the Lacedaemonians in their war with Athens. Athens was just then winning notable successes. She had just seized Pylus and Sphacteria, and that had provoked Spartan offers of peace. If Sparta's fortunes were low, it would be to the advantage of the King to keep her in the war while he was making gains in Asia, and he may have planned by means of a subsidy to encourage her to keep on fighting. At the beginning of the winter of 425/4 Artaxerxes sent his ambassador Artaphernes to Sparta to open serious discussions. The embassy was, however, intercepted by the Athenian garrison at Eion. Thucydides says that letters taken from Artaphernes showed that Artaxerxes had not yet determined upon a firm policy, because the several delegations which Sparta had sent him since 431 had each told a different story.⁸⁴ No doubt the Lacedaemonians, reacting to the changing fortunes of war, had vacillated over the price they would pay for Persian intervention, that is, how much Greek territory, if any, they would agree to see the King recover.

At Athens, the capture of Artaphernes,

and the growing danger of open war with his master Artaxerxes, produced irrational hopes that a parley with the King might end Persian interference with the empire and even foolish expectations that Persian friendship could be won.⁸⁵ Accordingly, the Athenian *demos* decided to approach the King, and its ambassadors went back with Artaphernes to Asia. When the delegation reached Ephesus, however, it learned that Artaxerxes had just died, so that the Athenian diplomats turned back.⁸⁶

After this abortive mission, in the summer of 424 the Athenians carried out their planned penetration of northwestern Asia Minor. While one expedition was taking Antandrus from the Mytilenean exiles holding it, and garrisoning the place, against the terms of the peace, the general Lamachus sailed past the Cyanean Rocks to the territory of Heraclea. Here, in the mouth of the Cales river, his squadron was almost at once destroyed in a violent storm.⁸⁷

This dramatic disaster, coming so soon after the flouting of a solemnly sworn treaty, probably convinced some Athenians that Olympus disapproved of their scorn of the peace. This, and the unexpected victories of the Spartan Brasidas in Thrace, gave the Athenians powerful motives for abandoning the harassment of the Persian Empire.

Meanwhile, in Persia itself, there was great confusion. Artaxerxes had been succeeded by his son Xerxes II, but the latter's reign was abruptly terminated by his murder. His assassin and successor Secundianus was in turn quite soon killed by

82. Caunus: List 34, II 11. In List 27, III 24 and List 34, I 94, Colophon pays only five hundred drachms, which must mean that only the loyal faction at Notium was contributing and that Colophon herself had not been retaken by Athens.

83. The assessment: *IG* 12. 63+ = Meiggs-Lewis, No. 69 = *ATL*, II, A 9, IV 126-72; *ATL*, III, 116.

84. Thuc. 2. 67. 1; 4. 50. 1-2.

85. Ar. *Ach.* 102-13 ridicules Athenian hopes of friendship with Persia; in *Eg.* 478 Aristophanes makes one character

accuse another of conspiring with the Medes. A. E. Raubitschek in *GRBS*, V (1964), 155, thought that Athens was on friendly terms with Persia at this time. That cannot be, in view of what had happened at Colophon, Notium, and Caunus, and in view of Athens' interventions in Caria, Lycia, and Pontus.

86. Thuc. 4. 50. 3.

87. Thuc. 4. 75. 1-2; Diod. 12. 72. 2, 4.

Darius II, who thus mounted to the blood-soaked golden throne of the Achaemenidae.⁸⁸ He was for some time troubled by revolts in certain satrapies, and, like the Athenians, he must have looked forward to a period of peace in Asia Minor. In this atmosphere of increasing mutual toleration, in 424/3, Athens sent yet another embassy to Susa. Negotiation was fruitful, and both parties agreed to renew the Peace of Callias.⁸⁹

Darius, however, was almost at once guilty of at least an unfriendly act. When the Athenians expelled the Delians in 422, the satrap Pharnaces gave the miserable fugitives Atramyttium to live in. It would seem that Darius was collecting another group of anti-Athenian Greeks, like the Samians at Anaea. If that was his intention, it was soon frustrated, because the Athenians, in response to Apollo's oracular command, brought the Delians back again.⁹⁰

After the Archidamian War ended in 421, opportunities for Persia to make trouble were less safe, because Athens could, if need be, direct her whole strength against the western satraps. Darius was still troubled by revolts in his empire. For these reasons, we hear nothing of friction between Athens and Persia for some years. But toward 415, Pissuthnes, now in at least his twenty-fifth year of power, rebelled against the King. Three Persian generals, including the famous Tissaphernes, were sent against him. Pissuthnes, through his son Amorges, asked for Athens' help, and the Athenians, who at this time were dreaming of the conquest, not only of Sicily, but even of Carthage,

grasped the opportunity to injure Persia. A force led by Lycon was active in the spring of 414.⁹¹ Athens thus committed a flagrant wrong. The Persians met their danger by bribing Pissuthnes' soldiers, and the rebel was compelled to surrender. His punishment was to be murdered. Amorges continued the struggle with the King.⁹² Some Athenians now seem to have thought of intriguing with Pharnaces, the satrap of Dascylium.⁹³

These small events were soon subsumed in the appalling disaster, the loss of an entire fleet and army, which Athens suffered at Syracuse in 413. Many thought that Athens, once again at war with Sparta and her associates, also at war with some of the Sicilian states, and now simultaneously facing revolts by some of her most prominent allies, was finished. In Susa Darius must have thought, "Enough of intrigue and limited objectives." It was time to recover once and for all the lost territories in Asia Minor. It was time for war. And soon couriers went galloping down the King's highways to Dascylium and Sardis ordering Pharnaces and Tissaphernes to resume the collection of tribute from the Greek states and to negotiate with the Peloponnesians a treaty guaranteeing Persian possession of the coast. Other messengers sped to Tyre and Sidon to order the preparation of the Phoenician ships for war. The Peace of Callias was dead. Full scale conflict between the servants of the King and the Greeks soon commenced.⁹⁴

The period of cold war was over. It had lasted about thirty-six years, one generation more or less. Perhaps it was natural

88. Ctes. *Pers. epit.* 44–48; Diod. 12. 65. 1.

89. The principal ancient source is Andoc. 3. 29. See, too, the supporting evidence and discussion in H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 207–11; *ATL*, III, 277; A. Andrewes, *Historia*, X (1961), 305; R. Meiggs, *HSCP*, LXVII (1963), 10–11.

90. Thuc. 5. 1. 1, 32. 1; Diod. 12. 73. 1.

91. Andoc. 3. 29; Thuc. 8. 5. 5; Ctes. *Pers. epit.* 52. Dates

from H. T. Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 222; A. Andrewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5. Lycon: *IG* I², 302, line 73 = *SEG* X. 228 = Meiggs-Lewis, No. 77. See, too, *ATL*, III, 356; A. Andrewes, *loc. cit.*

92. Ctes. *Pers. epit.* 52; H. T. Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

93. *Ar. Av.* 1028–30.

94. Tissaphernes and Pharnaces: Thuc. 8. 5. 5, 6. 1; Diod. 13. 36. 5. The fleet: Diod. 13. 36. 5. The fighting: Thuc. 8. 16. 3.

that Persia and Athens should fight again, given the characteristics of Persian and Greek civilization. In the fifth century both were deeply colored by military idealism, the notion that men ought to prove by fighting that their courage was as great as their ancestors'. And so the contest was renewed by the scions of the empire builders who had followed Cyrus the Great and Darius and the descendants of the storied heroes who had opposed them at Marathon and Salamis.

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